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Abstract
During the last decades, research in phenomenological psy-
chopathology has provided a vast array of insights that are 
invaluable for understanding the experiential worlds of pa-
tients with schizophrenia. Precisely, knowledge of patients’ 
experiences is a necessary basis for a sound and thoughtful 
psychotherapy. This is especially important in psychothera-
py for schizophrenia, where patients’ experiences may not 
always be easily accessible or understandable. In the avail-
able literature, we found only scattered suggestions for a 
translation of insights from phenomenological psychopa-
thology into psychotherapeutic practice. The aim of this ar-
ticle is to offer a preliminary translation. First, we outline 
characteristics of the experiential worlds in schizophrenia, 
highlighting what we call “core experiences” and “experi-
ence-near concepts.” Then we explore the psychotherapeu-
tic methods and strategies that can be developed and elab-
orated on the basis of the accumulated research in phenom-
enological psychopathology, drawing also on experiences 
from a phenomenologically informed psychotherapy unit at 
the University Psychiatric Hospital of Ljubljana. Here, we pro-
pose principles of a phenomenological psychotherapy for 
schizophrenia, dividing them into the following subgroups: 
(1) overall goals, (2) general attitudes, (3) main domains, and 
(4) therapeutic strategies. The unique value of phenomeno-
logical psychotherapy seems to lie in its ability to capture the 
heart of the patients’ experiences and their inherent vulner-
abilities and then use these insights to inform psychothera-
peutic interventions. © 2019 S. Karger AG, Basel
Introduction
Ronald Bassman [1], author of A fight to be, who at the 
age of 23 years was diagnosed with schizophrenia and 
who later earned a doctorate and worked as a licensed 
psychologist, states: “I remain frustrated that mental 
health professionals have been slow to accept the value of 
experience-based knowledge and have not integrated that 
wisdom into the services they provide” [2]. Drawing on 
research in phenomenological psychopathology of 
schizophrenia, the aims of this article are to provide an 
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overview of experience-based knowledge and to outline 
possible ways of integrating these insights in psychother-
apeutic approaches for patients with schizophrenia.
Phenomenological psychopathology has a long tradi-
tion of a thorough and systematic approach to the study 
of anomalous and psychotic experiences in schizophre-
nia. With the notion of “phenomenology,” we refer to 
phenomenologically oriented research that draws on the 
continental philosophical tradition of phenomenology 
that includes prominent philosophers such as Edmund 
Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, etc. 
In other words, we are not using “phenomenology” in its 
ordinary meaning in Anglophone psychiatry, where it 
simply designates “description of mental phenomena” 
[3]. Today, phenomenological psychopathology or “phe-
nomenological-anthropological psychiatry,” as it is also 
sometimes named, denotes, as Wiggins and Schwartz [4] 
put it, “an ongoing research program rather than an 
achieved theory or set of categories.”
During the last decades, research in phenomenological 
psychopathology has been blooming, resulting in a vast 
and systematic array of insights which, in our view, are 
invaluable for understanding the experiential worlds of 
patients with schizophrenia. This clinical research direc-
tion enables us to partially understand what it might be 
like to experience oneself, others, and the world as pa-
tients with schizophrenia often do. It offers resources for 
grasping the complexity of experiential alterations and 
the deep vulnerability that accompanies being in a world 
that may appear deprived of the ontological securities and 
natural certitudes (e.g., of space, time, and causality) that 
otherwise ground our existence.
Precisely, knowledge of patients’ experiences is, in our 
view, a necessary basis for any sound and thoughtful psy-
chotherapy. This is perhaps especially important for psy-
chotherapy of schizophrenia, where patients’ experienc-
es may not always be easily accessible or understandable. 
Of course, patients may still appreciate a psychotherapy 
that is based on a trustful alliance and imbued with em-
pathic concerns for their wellbeing. However, such psy-
chotherapy may also be experienced as somewhat shal-
low if it is not grounded in a genuine understanding of 
their condition. In other words, the psychotherapist 
must know what he or she is treating, i.e., he or she must 
possess and convey an understanding of the altered ex-
periential life in schizophrenia. With appropriate inter-
views (vide infra), we can now explore patients’ experi-
ences in detail and acquire insights into their individual 
experiential configurations and inherent vulnerabilities, 
and these insights can inform decisions on how to plan, 
structure, and carry out suitable psychotherapeutic in-
terventions.
Despite a long tradition of research in phenomeno-
logical psychopathology, the many findings have rarely 
been incorporated into concrete psychotherapeutic ap-
proaches. Nonetheless, many classical authors in phe-
nomenological psychopathology emphasize a potential 
for psychotherapy, and some of them also present ideas 
on how to apply their insights in actual psychotherapy 
[5]. In contemporary phenomenological research, we also 
find scattered suggestions for such a translation of phe-
nomenological insights into psychotherapeutic practice 
(vide infra).
In the following sections, we outline characteristics of 
the experiential worlds in schizophrenia, highlighting 
what we call “core experiences” and “experience-near 
concepts.” Subsequently, we explore the psychotherapeu-
tic methods and strategies that can be developed and elab-
orated on the basis of the accumulated research in phe-
nomenological psychopathology of schizophrenia. These 
methods and strategies are informed also by insights from 
other existing psychotherapies for schizophrenia and by 
experiences from a psychotherapy unit at the University 
Psychiatric Hospital of Ljubljana, where a program for 
psychotherapy of schizophrenia has been based on a phe-
nomenological approach since 2005.
Experiential Worlds in Schizophrenia
It is not easy to describe or grasp what is it like to suf-
fer from schizophrenia, i.e., what a patient experiences 
and goes through [6]. Some might even claim that at-
tempts to understand schizophrenia are futile since 
schizophrenia is basically incomprehensible, or that such 
an understanding can never be generalized because ev-
eryone experiences it in his or her own unique way. It is 
certainly true that the experiential life of patients with 
schizophrenia is not always straightforwardly graspable 
for others and that the symptomatology of schizophrenia, 
as in other mental disorders, is permeated by biographical 
details and colored by the patients’ cultural-historical em-
bedment. However, phenomenological exploration of the 
experiential life of patients with schizophrenia reveals 
that such variance in clinical presentation appears on the 
backdrop of a typical, psychopathological Gestalt, char-
acterized by a trait-like constellation of “fundamental 
symptoms” (signs) such as autism, ambivalence, formal 
thought disorders, and disorders of affect [7], and “anom-
alous self-experiences” (also called “self-disorders”) such 
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as feelings of being radically different from others, a di-
minished sense of self, common sense problems, transi-
tivism, quasi-solipsistic experiences, and polymorphous 
anxiety (vide infra). In schizophrenia, psychosis may be 
related to stressors or it may be more continuous, but cru-
cially it often emerges from such initial experiential al-
terations. For example, an experience that it is as if certain 
thoughts in one’s stream of consciousness are not gener-
ated by oneself (Gedankenenteignung) may acquire a de-
lusional elaboration, where the patient comes to believe 
that these alien thoughts are, in fact, generated by some-
one else (thought insertion as a first rank symptom).
In the last 2 decades, systematic, phenomenologically 
informed empirical studies have documented that anom-
alous self-experiences hyperaggregate in schizophrenia 
spectrum disorders but not in other mental disorders [8], 
that they show a high degree of temporal stability [9, 10], 
and that they predict incident cases of schizophrenia 
spectrum disorders [11, 12]. In our view, anomalous self-
experiences are not only a promising phenotype for 
pathogenetic and etiological research but, as common de-
nominators of experiential life in schizophrenia spectrum 
disorders, they also hold a unique but so far unrealized 
potential for informing and guiding an experience-based, 
phenomenological approach to psychotherapy for schizo-
phrenia.
Here, we present a collection of “core experiences” in 
schizophrenia spectrum disorders. We also emphasize, in 
italics, important “experience-near concepts,” articulat-
ing particular mental phenomena that have been de-
scribed mostly in phenomenological psychopathology 
but also in general clinical psychopathology and psycho-
dynamic investigations or even been coined by patients 
themselves. In the final part of this section, we briefly 
present the fundamental disturbances in schizophrenia, 
as they are hypothesized in phenomenological psychopa-
thology. These disturbances are also called the generative 
disorders (French: troubles générateurs), since they are 
supposed to “lie” at the core of a mental disorder, gener-
ating, shaping, and prefiguring the range of symptoms 
and signs that may emerge and keeping them to some ex-
tent connected.
Core Experiences and Experience-Near Concepts
Patients with schizophrenia often report that they have 
felt fundamentally different from others (German: An-
derssein) long before their first acute psychotic episode. 
Some patients report that this feeling has been present 
from early childhood and their first memories, while oth-
ers describe that it emerged in early adolescence [13]. An-
derssein refers to enduring and pervasive feelings of being 
ontologically different from others or simply “wrong” as 
some patients put it. For some patients, this feeling may 
verge on something ineffable. However, others describe it 
as a feeling of not being a natural or real human being or 
of being categorically different from others – e.g., one pa-
tient said, “I’ve always felt as if others could almost smell 
that I was different. They could simply feel that I was a 
different animal in the herd. I always felt like a giraffe 
among rhinos” [14]. Often, these feelings of difference are 
intertwined with feelings of being estranged from the 
shared-social world (French: aliénation mentale), i.e. pa-
tients do regularly not feel at home or at ease in the world 
and among others. This is reminiscent of Heidegger’s 
concept of uncanniness (German: Unheimlichkeit), by 
which he sought to articulate an experience of profound 
unfamiliarity, which he also describes as the feeling of 
“not being at home” (unheimlich literally means “non-
homely”) [15]. For many patients, these feelings of being 
different resonate with inferiority feelings, which are 
sources of uneasiness and solitude but also sometimes of 
shame, despair, and suicidality [16].
In relation to the feelings of being different, patients 
also very often report problems with common sense, which, 
at their core, reflect an inability to simply take for granted 
what others consider obvious or matter of fact (German: 
Verlust der natürlichen Selbstverständlichkeit) [17]. In the 
social domain, patients typically report that they feel un-
easiness and uncertainty in relating to others. For exam-
ple, they describe that they find it difficult to grasp the 
unwritten rules of social interaction and that they there-
fore cannot tell what is relevant or irrelevant or appropri-
ate or inappropriate to say or do in various social situa-
tions. Some patients report that they, before striking up a 
conversation with someone, prepare themselves minute-
ly by imagining and playing out all possible scenarios that 
a certain conversation with another may take. Such a ten-
dency to analyze social situations, including others’ be-
haviors and reactions, are expressions of a hyperreflective 
stance. Hyperreflection may also take elements in the en-
vironment or aspects of oneself as the object of reflection. 
The latter sometimes leads to forms of self-monitoring, 
which may be operative alongside the patients’ interac-
tions with others, making spontaneous and smooth en-
gagements difficult. The patients may feel anxious, help-
less, and perplexed in the sense of being aware of their 
inability to master the situation (German: Ratlosigkeit) 
[18].
Along similar lines, patients may experience a pro-
found sense of vulnerability and defenselessness (German: 
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Wehrlosigkeit) [19]. An important manifestation of this 
kind of vulnerability is an experience of frozenness or pa-
ralysis in social situations. Some patients may, after expe-
riencing it a few times, fear it and some report that they 
avoid certain social situations due to it. Notably, we are 
not implying that experiences of frozenness or paralysis 
are the cause of social withdrawal and isolation, which are 
negative symptoms for which little is known regarding 
their etiology. We merely draw attention to the fact that 
some patients apparently link their own tendency to so-
cially withdraw to their experiences of frozenness or pa-
ralysis in certain social situations. Crucially, some pa-
tients prefer a generally withdrawn (but not negatively 
experienced) position that is balanced or compensated by 
certain ways of relating to the social world, whereas other 
patients find strategies to generally be with others and 
only withdraw when it becomes too stressful and paralyz-
ing and afterwards quickly find their way back to others. 
This intricate equilibrium, which is variously negotiated 
in individual patients, has been found to support stabili-
zation and recovery, and it has been described with the 
notion of positive withdrawal [20].
Anxiety may come in various forms in schizophrenia, 
i.e., from situational, usually social, and sometimes para-
noid forms of anxiety, potentially intensifying into panic 
attacks, to a more pervasive, global anxiety. In other 
words, patients do typically not only feel anxious in cer-
tain mundane situations or with regard to certain delim-
ited objects (e.g., phobias) but rather experience a kind of 
background or supramundane anxiety described by La-
ing [21] as ontological insecurity. Patients who feel onto-
logically insecure often experience themselves as painful-
ly exposed, thrown into a world that appears unreliable 
or threatening, and a basic need to hide or protect oneself 
may ensue.
Other core experiences concern feelings of emptiness 
and lack of a core or inner nucleus. Patients may describe 
that they lack an inner standpoint to rely on, start from, 
and direct them in life. For example, some patients report 
feeling like a chameleon in social situations in the sense 
of being overly adaptive to accommodate others’ opin-
ions (German: Haltlosigkeit). This feeling has also been 
described as an aspect of a diminished sense of self. It may 
involve incessant questioning of the basic premises of 
one’s identity, including one’s sexuality, and it is often 
closely tied to Anderssein. The diminished sense of self 
may also be accompanied by an experience of diminished 
presence in the world, i.e., a feeling of decreased affect-
ability and decreased emotional resonance and respon-
sivity, occasionally associated with a pervasively felt dis-
tance to the world, perhaps as if there is an invisible bar-
rier between the patient and the world.
Patients also often report various anomalous bodily 
experiences, including unusual bodily sensations (cenes-
thesias) and more pervasive feelings of being estranged 
from their own body, e.g., as if the body does not really fit 
or as if the body and mind are somehow disconnected. 
This experience of not feeling fully present in one’s own 
body has been described with the concept of disembodi-
ment [22, 23] and it is often accompanied by an experi-
ence of “only living in the head.” Some patients express 
that bodily contacts with others are deeply uncomfort-
able, describing intense anxiety in situations where others 
stand too close to them, touch them or hug them. For 
some, such close bodily contact may be felt as a deep 
threat to their very existence. In these experiences, there 
is also an element of loose or permeable ego-boundaries, 
which articulates a range of experiences of insufficient 
bodily demarcation. Many patients report feeling “too 
open” or “without any barriers,” as if others know what 
they are thinking or somehow have access to their inner 
life merely by looking at them – many patients may avoid 
eye contact, precisely because they fear that others may 
have access to their thoughts.
Finally, some patients experience a pervasive reorien-
tation in life, with new interests (often philosophical, 
spiritual, or metaphysical in nature), priorities, and inten-
tions. Here, the fundamental feeling of being different 
and exposed may manifest in what has been called a so-
lipsistic worldview [24]. For example, some patients de-
scribe fleeting feelings of being the very center of the 
world or of being the only existing creature in the world 
or that the world exists only inasmuch as they perceive it. 
This may be accompanied by feelings of unique respon-
sibilities or special insights into hidden dimensions of re-
ality or constituting layers of consciousness, which others 
typically are unaware of [25]. Other patients describe that 
“all attention is on them” – e.g., when walking in the 
streets, they may feel that they “stand out” and that others 
look at them or talk about them, but they have no idea 
why others do this.
Most importantly, the core experiences that we have 
described here are not independent, atomic-like symp-
toms but interdependent, mutually implicative aspects of 
the underlying psychopathological Gestalt of schizo-
phrenia. The Gestalt is a characteristic phenomenologi-
cal pattern, i.e., a certain unifying structure of experien-
tial, expressive, and behavioral phenomena. The core ex-
periences all bear an imprint of the Gestalt in which they 
are embedded and from which they receive their mean-
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ing, yet, at the same time, they infuse the Gestalt with its 
specific clinical rootedness [26, 27]. Phenomenological 
psychopathologists have sought to articulate the genera-
tive disorders (French: troubles générateurs) of schizo-
phrenia in different ways. For example, Minkowski [28] 
identified it as loss of vital contact with reality (French: la 
perte du contact vital avec la réalité), Blankenburg [17] 
emphasized a collapse of common sense, and Sass and 
Parnas [29] proposed the ipseity/hyperreflexivity distur-
bance model.
Today, crucial aspects of the psychopathological Ge-
stalt of schizophrenia can be systematically explored in 
phenomenologically based, semistructured interviews, 
especially in the EASE (Examination of Anomalous Self-
Experience) [30] and EAWE (Examination of Anoma-
lous World Experience) [31] interviews. Notably, patients 
who have participated in these interviews often remark 
that they were asked highly relevant questions and that 
the interviews addressed aspects of their life that really 
describe or even define them. Not infrequently, patients, 
who have received psychiatric treatment for years ask 
why nobody has ever before asked them these questions. 
Many patients express feelings of relief when realizing 
that the interviewer is familiar with the nature of their 
experiences or that others suffer from similar experienc-
es. Others again appreciate getting a “vocabulary” that 
allows them to give a name to and thus speak about expe-
riences that may have been almost ineffable but which 
often nonetheless have tormented them. Finally, many 
patients ask if we can help them to diminish or overcome 
the vulnerabilities that accompany some of the alterations 
of their experiential life. Over the years, many clinicians 
have also raised the question of how these issues can be 
addressed in psychotherapy. Drawing from more than a 
decade of experience from a psychotherapy unit at the 
University Psychiatric Hospital of Ljubljana (Slovenia), 
we will now outline what we consider tentative principles 
of an experience-near, phenomenological psychotherapy 
for schizophrenia.
Principles of Phenomenological Psychotherapy for 
Schizophrenia
We have divided the basic principles of such a phe-
nomenological psychotherapy for schizophrenia into 
the following subgroups: (1) overall goals, (2) general 
attitudes, (3) main domains, and (4) therapeutic strate-
gies.
Overall Goals
The general purpose of psychotherapy extends beyond 
symptom remission and can perhaps be described as that 
of alleviating distress, strengthening self-integration, and 
promoting recovery of functioning and well-being. Psy-
chotherapy will often involve gaining an increased insight 
and awareness of one’s vulnerabilities, acquiring capaci-
ties to handle them in different situations, and attaining 
more flexibility in interpersonal relationships. (1) For pa-
tients with schizophrenia, this general goal is perhaps best 
pursued in psychotherapy by working on diminishing the 
patient’s feeling of self-alienation as well as of estrange-
ment from others and the shared world. Ultimately, this 
may lessen or relax the feelings of being fundamentally 
different from others and of loneliness, anxiety, and de-
spair, and it may allow the patient to feel more at home in 
the world among others. (2) Consistently, we must help 
patients to strengthen their sense of self and self-pres-
ence, e.g., by supporting them in their quest for personal 
coherence and autobiographical, narrative identity, 
which may, in turn, enable them to feel better integrated 
within themselves. (3) We must also help them to engage 
in and maintain meaningful interpersonal relationships, 
both with individual others and with groups, thereby 
strengthening their sense of being accepted by others and 
of belonging to the human community. (4) It is important 
to know that many of the described core experiences are 
trait-like rather than state-like in nature, meaning that 
patients usually will not be permanently relieved from 
them. We work psychotherapeutically with a scope of ac-
ceptance and of more neutral or even positive valuation 
of these experiences. They can be viewed as a form of sen-
sitivity, openness, creativity, or awareness of different 
perspectives, etc. Such views may function as preventive 
measures against exaggerated centering or pessimistic 
preoccupation with these experiences.
General Attitudes
(1) To follow the described goals, we must first and 
foremost try to “stay with” the patients’ experiences and 
resist interpretations, which is far from obvious in clinical 
practice or standard procedure in psychotherapy. In oth-
er words, if we are to thoroughly explore the experiential 
life worlds of our patients and avoid misunderstandings, 
we must stay long enough with the “how” of the experi-
ence and not rush to the “why” of the experience. For ex-
ample, a patient offered the following description of her 
estranged relationship to her own body: “I feel I have this 
void inside. I try to fill it with food but that isn’t working 
well.” When asked to clarify, she said, “I think the void is 
Škodlar/HenriksenPsychopathology 2019;52:117–125122
DOI: 10.1159/000500163
a feeling of inadequacy, loneliness, a feeling of not being 
sufficient, and lack of meaning. I really don’t know who I 
am, what I’m supposed to do, and what I’m here for.” To 
further clarify the nature of this experience, the patient 
was asked if the void has a spatial location. She replied, 
“Yes, I actually feel that it’s right in the solar plexus. I feel 
it’s gigantic, larger than my body. Like a big Pilates ball 
perhaps. There, I’m missing something. Some meaning is 
missing. I can physically feel the void. I have had it for 
many years. There is a space that is not filled out with 
anything. There’s just a black void” [32]. This example il-
lustrates the importance of staying with the “how” of ex-
perience, clarifying its nature and meaning, before in-
quiring into “why” she thinks she feels inadequate and 
lonely, lacks meaning, etc., though the latter of course also 
is psychotherapeutically relevant in due time. (2) In our 
view, this focus on staying with the “how” of the experi-
ence has not only epistemic value but also a profound 
emotional and relational value. Patients usually feel that 
they have been heard, sincerely understood, and not 
judged. It can be phrased in the way that the patients’ ex-
periences are welcomed with a holding and containing at-
titude, providing an opportunity for a corrective emotion-
al, relational, and embodied experience (as it is conceptu-
alized in psychoanalytic psychotherapy) [33]. (3) The 
psychotherapist’s role is like that of an anchor, of a dia-
logue partner, and, at the same time, of a translator or 
bridge to the minds of others, to commonsensical knowl-
edge, expectations, and reactions. Successfully managing 
this challenging role as a psychotherapist requires, in our 
view, solid phenomenological and psychodynamic 
knowledge, enabling the therapist to sincerely listen, to 
know how to ask questions, to know what to ask and what 
not to ask, and to know how and when to proceed in the 
psychotherapeutic process.
Main Domains
Psychotherapy covers many different domains of 
which we will only mention a few. (1) One important do-
main concerns thought process and its disturbances, e.g., 
thought pressure or block, ruminations, obsessions, 
pseudo-obsessions, failing sense of mineness of thoughts, 
intruding thoughts, etc. Since hyperreflectivity often is a 
central part of the clinical picture of schizophrenia, the 
therapist should be attentive not to additionally fuel an 
already existing hyperreflective stance, which potentially 
may increase patients’ sense of estrangement from and 
distance to others and the world [34]. (2) Another impor-
tant domain concerns emotions and their disturbances, 
e.g., feelings of an emotional barrier, anxiety, inauthen-
ticity, defenselessness, distance, nonemotional affectivity 
[35], instability, ambivalence, and perplexity [36]. A very 
important theme in this domain is also trauma, which 
patients with schizophrenia often have experienced and 
which should be appropriately addressed in psychother-
apy [37]. Here, we must also address recurrent or perva-
sive feelings of meaninglessness, nihilism [38], despair, 
and suicidality [13]. (3) Intersubjectivity constitutes an-
other crucial domain for psychotherapy. Here, the pa-
tients’ manifold experiences of problems with common 
sense, their difficulties with spontaneously interacting 
with others, and their experiences of insufficient bodily 
demarcation must be addressed, including their avoid-
ance or withdrawal strategies as well as their compensa-
tory strategies for engaging in and maintaining interper-
sonal relationships. (4) Also the body itself, with its pal-
ette of unusual bodily sensations, feelings of 
disembodiment, and dissociative phenomena, etc., which 
are not always easily put into words, must be explored 
with the patients. (5) The final domain, which we will 
mention here, concerns the patients’ propensity to adopt 
a solipsistic worldview, often accompanied by existential 
reorientation [39], spiritual or philosophical endeavors, 
and sometimes mystical-like experiences. The solipsistic 
worldview may be part of the Bleulerian phenomenon of 
“double bookkeeping” by which patients, at the same 
time, “know the real state of affairs as well as the falsified 
one.” [7, p. 56]. Recently, double bookkeeping has been 
described as a predicament of simultaneously living in 2 
different worlds, i.e., the shared-social world and a pri-
vate-solipsistic world [40]. Instead of trying to disprove 
patients’ solipsistic worldview or nullify their double 
bookkeeping, the therapist could preferably try to balance 
and stabilize it, thereby helping patients to better distin-
guish between experiences that pertain to and are relevant 
for their engagement with others in the shared world and 
experiences that are more deeply connected to their so-
lipsistic worldview. 
Therapeutic Strategies
(1) Pursuit of the therapeutic goals as described above 
helps form a welcoming, humane, tolerant, and nonjudg-
mental psychotherapeutic environment. Many psycho-
therapy and community programs and settings, past and 
present, have documented that such an environment in 
itself is therapeutic – something the work in our unit of 
psychotherapy for psychosis in Ljubljana also testifies to. 
(2) In psychotherapy for schizophrenia, taking place ei-
ther within or outside such therapeutic milieus, it is cru-
cial to operate with structured and carefully planned ac-
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tivities embedded in scheduled daily and weekly routines. 
From clinical experience and many autobiographical ac-
counts of schizophrenia, including the exceptional one by 
Prof. Elyn Saks [41], we know how important an environ-
mentally imposed or self-generated structure (also called 
the “exoskeleton”) [42] is for treatment. (3) To facilitate a 
transition from a more passive, withdrawn, or observing-
analyzing stance to a more active, social stance, patients 
often need additional support and encouragement to par-
ticipate in various social activities. In our view, social ac-
tivities that are organized around specific purposes and 
which have a temporal-spatial structure and clearly for-
mulated rules and social roles are by many patients expe-
rienced as relatively safe, tolerable, and enjoyable, and 
they may be a platform to meet and interact with others 
and to build comradeships, friendships, and partner-
ships. (3) However, while encouraging patients to be so-
cially active, we must also respect their need to organize 
their own personal space and accept their need to with-
draw when situations become too stressful before they 
again find their way back to others. Crucially, such a form 
of positive withdrawal should not be mistaken for more 
malignant forms of withdrawal or taking refuge from the 
world of others (also called psychic retreats) [43].
(4) In the domain of affect and emotion regulation, we 
suggest turning to body-oriented psychotherapeutic 
strategies, e.g., relaxation techniques, mindfulness, move-
ment therapies, and physical activities. With these strate-
gies, we encourage patients to cultivate dereflexion, i.e., 
lessening of hyperreflectivity, emotional letting go, and 
acceptance attitudes vividly exemplified in the so-called 
acceptance and commitment therapy [44]. These strate-
gies may prevent feelings of paralysis or frozenness [45], 
which some patients experience in social situations when 
they feel vulnerably exposed or defenseless in front of 
others. These strategies may also, in part, help patients to 
overcome the overwhelming consequences of physical or 
sexual trauma. These body-oriented psychotherapeutic 
strategies may also help patients to move from a passive, 
hyperreflective, “truth-taking stare” [46], with weakness 
in practical activities (French: affaiblissment pragma-
tique) to a more socially active position, catching the em-
bodied flow, without slipping into an automatic, hyper-
reflective “paralysis.” More generally, these body-orient-
ed psychotherapeutic strategies may help increase a basic 
sense of embodiment.
(5) Finally, we want to stress that, when applying these 
therapeutic strategies, it is especially important to con-
tinually affirm, support, and respect patients’ quests and 
endeavors in art, literature, science, philosophy, spiritual-
ity, etc. Many forms of art therapies can be very beneficial 
for encouraging, developing, and supporting these quests. 
In doing so, we help them find their own “islands of clar-
ity” [47], i.e., their own sense of meaning or purpose in 
life, which they can express to others and pursue among 
them or individually. It is, after all, their life to lead.
Discussion and Conclusion
The principles of phenomenological psychotherapy 
described in the previous section are compatible with 
proposals for psychotherapy by other phenomenologi-
cally oriented authors. For example, Stanghellini and Ly-
saker [48] suggest that psychotherapy should focus on of-
fering a second-person perspective within a shared part-
nership in order to help patients overcome difficulties in 
the intersubjective domain. Fuchs [49] has proposed that 
the scope of psychotherapy consists in diminishing the 
limitations of patients’ lived space with re-opening their 
horizons of possibilities through a dyadic, experiential 
space, i.e., a “fusion of horizons” of the patient and the 
therapist. In phenomenologically informed psychothera-
py, some authors have stressed the importance of pa-
tients’ developing precise verbalized descriptions of their 
self-disorders [50] and of understanding the interrela-
tions between self-disorders, hyperreflectivity, perplexi-
ty, emotions, life events, and goals [51]. The processes of 
finding appropriate descriptions of anomalous self-expe-
riences and of reaching an understanding of these experi-
ence as they occur within the patients’ life worlds unfold, 
in our view, together with patients’ quest for meaning and 
coherent autobiographical narratives [52], which remain 
crucial for recovery [53]. The search for meaningfulness, 
which is a vital component of any psychotherapeutic pro-
cess, is part of the psychotherapeutic relationship and 
may be viewed as a kind of shared meaningfulness [54].
In this article, we have emphasized certain specific 
goals, attitudes, domains, and strategies. While we believe 
that these are central and relevant in psychotherapy of 
schizophrenia, we are not suggesting that they are some-
how exhaustive of a phenomenologically informed 
 psychotherapy of schizophrenia. For example, we have 
deliberately left out the question of how to psychothera-
peutically approach and treat psychosis from a phenom-
enological perspective. In our view, psychosis in schizo-
phrenia may, as noted, be related to stressors or it may be 
more continuous but independently it will often arise on 
the basis of a more persistent vulnerability, which is re-
flected in a characteristic alteration of experiential life 
Škodlar/HenriksenPsychopathology 2019;52:117–125124
DOI: 10.1159/000500163
and exemplified by various anomalous self-experiences. 
Therefore, we suggest that this basic vulnerability is a key 
target of psychotherapy. Notably, a phenomenological 
approach, as we have described here, does not rely on or 
provide a theory of specific intrapersonal, intersubjective, 
and interactional dynamics that condition the develop-
ment of psychosis from the basic vulnerability. In other 
words, given that such a phenomenological psychothera-
py for schizophrenia is not founded on a specific theory, 
it may be combined with other psychotherapies with dif-
ferent theoretical foundations; we have already indicated 
how it may be fruitfully combined with psychodynamic 
[55], mindfulness, and body-oriented psychotherapies 
[56]. In our view, the unique value of phenomenological 
psychotherapy lies in its ability to capture the heart of the 
patients’ experiences and their inherent vulnerabilities 
and then use these insights to inform psychotherapeutic 
interventions.
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